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The Italian economy is often said to be on a declining path. In this paper, 
we document that: (i) Italy’s current decline is a labor productivity 
problem (ii) the labor productivity slowdown stems from declining 
productivity growth in all industries but utilities (with manufacturing 
contributing for about one half of the reduction) and diminished inter-
industry reallocation of workers from agriculture to market services; (iii) 
the labor productivity slowdown has been mostly driven by declining 
TFP, with roughly unchanged capital deepening. The only mild decline of 
capital deepening is due to the rise in the value added share of capital that 
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1. Introduction 
 
“Italy needs a strong injection of competition in market services” 
Luca Cordero di Montezemolo, Chairman of Confindustria; October 15, 2005 
 “China, the WTO and the Euro changeover have precipitated Italy in a deep structural crisis” 
Giulio Tremonti, Minister of the Economy; October 5, 2005 
 “Italy’s decline is due to the disappointing performance of the manufacturing sector” 
Antonio Fazio, former Governor of the Bank of Italy; May 31, 2005 
 
No doubt, as witnessed by the opinions reported above (in inverse chronological order), the 
perception that the Italian economy is on a declining path is now widespread. If anything, the 
outlook of the Italian economy kept worsening throughout the 2000s, with a definite acceleration of 
such worsening through the recessionary waves of the last quarter of 2004 and the first quarter of 
2005.
1 
As reflected in the quotes above, though, ideas are disparate when one comes to indicate why and 
how Italy ended up on such a path. The variety of opinions is possibly related with the little 
attention so far devoted to carefully analyze the industry details of the alleged decline of the Italian 
economy. This is why in this paper we take a close watch of Italy’s decline as through the lens of a 
looking glass. We see this undertaking as a crucial step to achieve a better understanding of what is 
wrong with the Italian economy and, most of all, what could be done to reverse the current negative 
trends. 
We do so exploiting publicly available aggregate and industry data from the OECD and ISTAT. 
This gives us a good starting point to analyze labor productivity and total factor productivity trends 
for the aggregate economy from 1970 onwards and for twenty-seven industries from 1980 onwards 
and helps us provide the intended snapshot of Italy’s declining productivity trends.
2 
We reach three main conclusions. First and foremost, most of Italy’s economic decline stems from 
decreasing labor productivity (not hours). Second, the standard decomposition of industry 
productivity trends shows that the bulk (80%) of Italy’s productivity slowdown originates from a 
generalized within-industry slowdown (or outright declines), mainly in durable and non-durable 
manufacturing. Diminished inter-industry reallocation from agriculture onto market services 
contributed the remaining 20% of the slowdown. Third, the labor productivity slowdown was 
                                                 
1 The improved results of the second quarter of 2005, even if confirmed in the remaining quarters of 2005, will not 
change this long-run picture in any way. 
2 Bassanetti, Iommi, Jona-Lasinio and Zollino (2004) have provided evidence on aggregate and industry productivity 
developments in the Italian economy, with a rather different goal, though: computing the growth contributions of the 
different factors of production.   2
mostly accounted for by a marked deceleration of TFP, which was not the result of an unfortunate 
cyclical contingency (the current slowdown is worse than in any former downturn in the last twenty 
years). The only mild decline in capital deepening (particularly evident in manufacturing) is due to 
the rise in the value added share of capital that counteracted the decline in capital accumulation. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we start from basics and provide evidence of 
why Italy may be seen as a declining economy and why productivity is the crucial variable to look 
at when thinking of Italy’s economic decline. This may be seen as an unusually long (but 
necessary!) motivation for writing this paper. In Section 3, we present basic but detailed enough 
evidence for Italy’s trends in labor productivity growth across industries. In Section 4, standard 
industry decomposition provides evidence for rating the relative importance of within vs. between 
components in industry labor productivity growth. In section 5, industry labor productivity growth 
is decomposed in the standard capital deepening and TFP components. In extensions section 6, we 
investigate how our main results are affected by some of the simplifying assumptions necessary to 
carry out TFP calculations at the industry level with the data set we are endowed with. We thus 
evaluate whether the current TFP slowdown presents similar business cycle properties compared to 
former downswings, whether the omission of quality improvements from the productivity 
contributions of each factor of production is biasing our conclusions and finally whether declining 
manufacturing productivity may be the side-effect of the declining productivity performance of 
market services. Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
2. Italy’s decline is caused by the declining performance of labor 
productivity 
 
2.1 Italy’s “decline” … 
When speaking of a country’s decline, long-run data on per–capita GDP have to be looked at.  
In his book, Angus Maddison (2001) provides such long-run data for a large number of countries. 
Maddison’s data are still being systematically updated by Bart van Ark and his coauthors at the 
Groningen Center for Growth and Development (GGDC; www.ggdc.net) From the most recent 
release of their Total Economy Database, one learns that Italy’s growth rate of per-capita GDP has 
been on a mildly declining trend (by roughly -0.1 percentage points per year) for a long while. This 
is pictured in Figure 1. 
   3
Figure 1



































































































































































































































Italy’s per-capita GDP growth was 5.4% in the 1950s, 5.1% in the 1960s, 3.1% in the 1970s, 2.2% 
in the 1980s and 1.4% in the 1990s. A rough-and-ready extrapolation of this decade-long continued 
slowdown would lead to expect no more than 0.5% in the 2000s (so far we are at some 0.6% over 
2000-05, if per-capita GDP stays constant in 2005). In any case, nowadays, the miracle years of the 
1950s-1960s seem quite far away in time. 
The declining growth performance of “mature” countries over time is in fact a standard prediction 
of the Solow growth model. And indeed the available empirical evidence (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1990), Caselli and Tenreyro (2005)) shows that this prediction is broadly borne by a host of other 
OECD countries. To gain a better understanding of the extent and the boundaries of Italy’s relative 
growth slowdown, it is thus more informative to graph how Italy fared against the backdrop of the 
average growth performance of, say, the other big European countries (France, Germany,
3 the UK, 
and Spain;
4 “Europe” henceforth). Concentrating on the big European countries cuts short the 
question of how to properly define a benchmark (the European Union as a whole is a bit of a 
moving target throughout such a long period of time; the choice of  the Euro area would leave the 
UK out). 
                                                 
3 By “Germany’s growth” we mean the growth of Western Germany before 1991 and the growth of Unified Germany 
from 1991 onwards. 
4 The inclusion of Spain does not change the qualitative features of the picture. Leaving Spain  out of  the benchmark, 
the positive bars in the 1950s and the 1960s would be higher, while the negative bars of the 2000s would be less 
pronounced. But Spain is indeed one of the big countries in Europe.   4
Figure 2






































































































































































































































































The positive bars in Figure 2 correspond to years when Italy was growing faster than the rest of 
Europe, while the negative bars shows the years when Italy’s growth lagged behind Europe. 
Figure 2 does provide a clear picture. It concisely shows that Italy, being much poorer than Europe 
(poorer than France, Germany and the UK, but richer than Spain) in 1950, has been catching up fast 
until – roughly - the early 1990s. 
This process of convergence has reversed its course since then, however. In the 1950s and the 
1960s, Italy grew faster than Europe six times in each decade; in the 1970s and the 1980s this 
occurred four and five times respectively. In the 1990s, instead, this occurred only twice, in 1991 
and 1995. Since 1995, then, Italy’s per-capita GDP has grown less than (the other big countries in) 
Europe’s GDP.
 5 
Altogether, the long-run data suggest that the bad performance of the Italian economy is not the 
figment of the currently unfortunate business cycle contingency. This is why speaking of decline 
may not be totally unwarranted. With one caveat to add, though: given that the rest of Europe has 
been and is still growing at a positive pace, Italy’s alleged decline is of a relative, not an absolute 
type. Italy’s per-capita GDP has simply grown not as fast as Europe’s GDP, but has not diminished 
over time (yet): since 1995, living standards (as measured by per-capita GDP) have actually gone 
                                                 
5 Had the benchmark been the average growth performance of France, Germany and the UK (leaving Spain out), 2001 
would have been another mildly good year (in relative terms), with Italy growing faster than “Europe Big 3” by a 
decimal of a percentage point.   5
up by a cumulative 12%. The problem with this state of affairs is that a diminishing growth rate 
may herald a true absolute decline in the years to come. 
 
2.2 … is caused by its declining productivity performance 
A standard method to describe the evolution of per-capita GDP involves decomposing its evolution 
in the combined trends of three variables, two economic and one demographic. The two economic 
variables are labor productivity (output per hour worked), and the total number of hours worked per 
each Italian in his/her working age (15-64). The demographic variable is the ratio between working 
age population and total population. 
Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2004) recently documented that, when asking the question of why 
Europe is poorer than the US, the answer is: mostly because of its lower labor input per person, not 
because of its lower productivity per hour. Recently released data from the OECD indeed confirm 
that this continues to be the case in 2004 (see Table 1). Per-capita GDP in the Euro area is 29% 
lower than in the US: two thirds of this much is due to lower labor input and one third is due to 
labor productivity. This is clearly the case for Germany. It applies to France as well, where labor 
turns out to be even more productive than the US. It is apparent for Italy too: the 30% gap of Italy’s 
per-capita GDP with respect to the US is accounted for by a “minus 22%” of lower labor input and 
a “minus 8%” of lower productivity per hour worked.
6 
Table 1: Decomposing Europe’s gap with the US, 2004 
  Per-capita GDP  Hours per capita  GDP per hour 
  [1] [2] [3] 
Euro area  -29  -20  -9 
Italy -30  -22  -8 
France -26  -33  +7 
Germany -28  -21  -8 
UK -21  -8  -13 
Spain -36  -11  -24 
EU-19 -33  -16  -16 
Note: the figures in column [1] are the sums of the figures in column [2] and [3]. Each of them measures the 
gap (in percentage points) between the level of the corresponding variable in the country at hand and the 
level of the same variable in the US. 
Source: OECD productivity database (http://www.oecd.org/statistics/productivity) 
 
                                                 
6 Table 1 also shows that Europe is not completely similar in this respect. The bulk of the UK and Spanish gap with the 
US originates on the productivity side, not on the labor input side. The same applies to Europe as a whole, when a 
European aggregate inclusive of some of the Eastern European countries (EU-19) is used. If one does so, the EU-US 
gap is roughly equally split into its labor and productivity components.   6
Yet, when thinking about Italy’s alleged decline, one is not thinking about per-capita GDP or 
productivity levels as they are today. Today’s levels are the result of growth over the indefinite 
past. Italy’s current decline is instead a more recent phenomenon that stems from declining growth 
rates of the same variables over the last ten years or so, not throughout the indefinite past. But when 
one looks at such recent growth rates, the picture changes considerably: the declining growth rate of 
per-capita GDP is mostly due to the declining growth of productivity per man hour and partly to 
demographic forces, but certainly not to declining labor input – quite the opposite. 
This is summarized in Table 2 where the compounded growth rates of per-capita GDP and its three 
components (labor productivity, hours per person in working age and potential workers-population 
ratio) are reported for three periods (1970-1980, 1980-1995, 1995-2004). 
Table 2 shows how sharply and deeply the sources of growth in the Italian economy have changed 
over time. In the 1970s and the 1980s through 1995, the contribution of labor to growth was 
negative for 0.7-0.8 percentage point per year. This was the period during which the Italian labor 
market functioned so badly to push unemployment up to more 12% of the labor force. From 1995 
onwards, the contribution of labor to growth instead turned positive for about one percentage point 
per year – the result of rapidly rising employment rates and stagnating average hours worked. 
In parallel, labor productivity growth slowed down abruptly after 1995 from the very high rates of 
the 1970s and the 1980s. As reported in Table 2, labor productivity (measured by GDP per hour 
worked for the aggregate economy) grew by 0.5% per year in the Italian economy in 1995-2004. 
This is a marked slowdown compared to the 4% growth rate recorded in the 1970s and the 2% 
growth rate recorded in 1980-95. In turn, the slowdown in labor productivity growth gained further 
momentum throughout the decade, falling from +0.9% in 1995-2000 to -0.1% in 2000-04. 
To immediately grasp the entity of the slowdown one can use the “rule of 70”: at the 1970s pace, 
the number of years required to double productivity levels was about 18 years, while this has gone 
up to 33 years in 1980-95 and even further up to 54 years at the growth rates that have prevailed in 
the last decade: at these rates, now it takes three times as long as in the 1970s to double labor 
productivity levels. 
 
Table 2: Decomposing Italy’s per-capita GDP growth, 1970-2004 
Growth rates of  Per-capita GDP  GDP  per 
hour worked
Hours per working 
age person 
Working age population 
over total population 
1970-80 3.1  3.9  -0.8  0.0 
1980-95 1.8  2.1  -0.7  0.4 
1995-04 1.3  0.5  1.0  -0.2 
Source: OECD productivity database and OECD Economic Outlook database, September 2005   7
Altogether, this amounts to saying that the performance of the Italian labor market, so poor in 
accommodating the entry of the baby boomers as well as, more generally, of women in the past, 
definitely improved in the last ten years. But this seemingly occurred through an outward shift of 
the labor supply curve, possibly eased by the piecemeal reforms in the labor market which resulted 
in liberalization of part-time and temporary employment. The labor demand curve did not 
seemingly shift out much, instead. This materialized in higher labor input than in the past, but in 
parallel with a growth slowdown of productivity (and wages, not pictured here). 
The previous data say that, although Italy’s relative poverty today with respect to the United States 
(as well as the UK and the Nordic countries in the European Union), has still mostly to do with its 
labor input deficiencies, the declining tendency of the last ten years or so is instead mostly caused 
by a declining performance of labor productivity. This is why, when discussing Italy’s decline, 
labor productivity, not hours, is the keyword. 
 
 
3. The labor productivity slowdown across industries: manufacturing 
versus services 
 
In the previous section, we clarified that labor productivity, not hours, is responsible for Italy’s 
decline. This is just a first step. Our second step here, motivated by the variety of authoritative 
quotes reported at the outset, is to present an industry breakdown of Italy’s growth of aggregate 
labor productivity. The main questions are: Is the productivity slowdown mainly due to the decline 
of Italy’s manufacturing? Or, rather, is it caused by the growing inefficiency of services industries? 
Our industry data refer to twenty-seven industries corresponding to the sub-sections of NACE 
Rev.1 classification for mining and manufacturing industries and to the sections for the other 
sectors, with the exclusion of “Public administration and defense” (section L), “Private households 
with employed persons” (section P) and “Letting of own property” (group 70.2). 
The industry-level data for labor productivity employed here may not be consistent with the 
aggregate data taken from the OECD Productivity Database. In the OECD Productivity database, 
the OECD Secretariat provides an estimate of total hours worked reconciling the various national 
sources; labor productivity is thus measured as GDP per hour worked. Our industry data are instead 
from the OECD STAN database (in turn derived from the latest release of industry data from 
ISTAT) where no such attempt is made. Labor productivity is thus GDP per FTE employed person. 
To analyze the industry evidence over a long time span, we had to choose a labor productivity 
measure based on the number of full-time equivalent employed (FTE) persons rather than on the 
total number of hours worked, for the number of hours worked is not available at the industry level   8
for the 1970s and the 1980s.
7 The OECD STAN data base allows one to compute labor productivity 
as the ratio between value added and the total number of full-time equivalent employed persons 
from 1970 onwards. 
8 
Although our underlying data set refers to twenty-seven industries, we present summary tables just 
for a handful of industries: agriculture, manufacturing (in turn split into its two main durable and 
non-durable components), utilities, constructions and business sector services, in addition to the 
aggregate for the total economy. This level of disaggregation is sufficient for conveying our main 
message: Italy’s current productivity slowdown is the combination of a full-fledged productivity 
collapse in manufacturing productivity, but it looks more like a missed opportunity in the service 
sector. 
Table 3 shows such figures. Before delving into the analysis of how productivity evolved within 
the broad one-digit industry groups, it is worthwhile to remind that the employment-based indicator 
in Table 3 usually grows less than the hour-based indicator in Table 2. From column 3 in Table 2, 
one learns that GDP per hour worked grew at, respectively 3.9%, 2.1% and 0.5% per year in 1970-
80, 1980-95 and 1995-04. Over the same periods of time, value added per FTE employed person 
grew at rates of 2.4%, 1.8% and 0.4%. The explanation is simple: given that the number of average 
hours worked kept declining over time at a particular fast pace in the 1970s and the 1980s, it is no 
wonder that the growth rate of labor productivity growth, measured in terms of employed persons in 
Table 3, grows at a slower pace than labor productivity measured in terms of hours worked. This 
discrepancy has become much smaller over time, though, in line with the leveling off of the decline 
in the average number of hours worked in the Italian economy in the 2000s.  
Table 3 shows that, in the last ten years, the decline has been particularly abrupt for manufacturing. 
This is at odds with the former decade: the mild (with today’s eyes) productivity slowdown in the 
1970s was mainly driven by the productivity slowdown in market services (and construction), with 
labor productivity in manufacturing steadily growing at solid rates (3% per year or so). Recently, 
instead, the growth of labor productivity in manufacturing essentially zeroed. This was a big change 
if compared to the average yearly growth rates of 3% over 25 years: manufacturing has indeed 
traditionally been the quintessential fast-growing part of the economy, in Italy as in many other 
countries, as theorized by Baumol (1967) and documented, among others, by Baumol, Batey 
Blackman and Wolff (1994) and Caselli and Tenreyro (2005). 
 
                                                 
7 Preliminary data on industry hours worked have been released by ISTAT in June 2005, but they only go back to 1993. 
In order to preserve the long-run flavour of our discussion, we stick to the data currently available in STAN, which only 
provides the number of full-time equivalent employed persons. 
8 See the Appendix for a definition.   9
Table 3: Growth of labor productivity (value added per full-time equivalent employed 
person), 1970-2003, main industry groups 
  1970-80 1980-95 1995-03  1995-00 2000-03 
Economy  2.4 1.8 0.6  1.1 -0.2 
Agriculture  3.1 4.3 2.7  5.2 -1.5 
Manufacturing  2.8 3.0 0.2  1.0 -1.0 
-- non-durables       2.7       3.1       0.3       0.7      -0.2 
-- durables       2.9       2.7       0.0       1.7       -2.7 
Utilities  -0.4 0.8 5.5  3.7 8.7 
Construction  1.9 1.0 0.1  0.5 -0.5 
Business sector services  1.8 1.1 0.1  0.5 -0.5 
Public services  1.4 0.7 0.4  0.8 -0.1 
Source: own calculations from OECD STAN data 
 
In the 1970s, the manufacturing sector – about 27% of total FTE employment - used to grow above 
average in Italy too, although just by one half of a percentage point (2.8% against 2.4% which was 
the average for the whole economy). Not by chance, in the past, a number of Italian economists 
have concentrated their attention on the difficulties of the Italian manufacturing sector, somehow 
eternally lagging behind, as the key retarding force for Italy’s economic development. 
Yet in the 1980s (through 1995), things changed. As seen in the next sections, the rapid growth of 
capital-labor ratios fuelled a parallel rapid growth rate of value added per employed person in the 
manufacturing sector by 3% per year over fifteen years. This was the average of the 3.1% growth 
rate experienced in the industries producing non-durable goods and the 2.7% in the industries 
producing durable goods. Manufacturing growth was well above aggregate productivity growth, 
which averaged +1.8% per year in that period of time. This occurred while the sector as a whole 
definitely declined as a share of total FTE employment, from 28% in 1980 to 22% in 1995 – a 
reflection of the firm restructuring in non-durable goods production, which fell from 19% to 15% of 
total employment. This occurred with particular intensity in the last bit of 1980-1995. 
In the last ten years or so, another dramatic turnaround – initially gone unnoticed – materialized, 
with the zeroing of the growth rate of labor productivity in manufacturing. Productivity growth first 
declined to one per cent per year in 1995-2000 and then turned negative by one percentage point in 
2000-2003, with the data for the more recent years (2004 and 2005) confirming such negative 
trends. 
This is startling for such a declining path manifested itself rather uniformly in the whole 
manufacturing sector, although slightly scattered around over time. In 1995-2000, labor   10
productivity growth fell first and substantially in non-durable goods industries from 3.1% to 0.7%, 
while labor productivity for durable producers slowed down just a bit (from 2.7% to 1.7%). In the 
more recent years, productivity growth collapsed for durable producers as well (-2.7% in 2000-
2003) and further slowed down by another percentage point for non-durable producers (from 0.7% 
to -0.2%). 
The bad productivity performance of Italy’s manufacturing sector is bad news for two different but 
equally relevant reasons. 
Non-durable production includes textiles, wearing and leather – all landmarks of the “Made-in-
Italy” production. If the productivity of non-durable producers declines, this is particularly 
worrisome, because fast-growing productivity is the only means to restore profits and maintain jobs 
in such industries threatened by low-cost production from Asia and Eastern Europe. 
Durable production, in turn, is meant to be the most likely vehicle of introduction of technical 
change and new modes of production (and therefore the industry with the potentially highest 
productivity growth rate). Depending on the availability of such things as human capital, R&D 
investment and the like, we may expect to see these industries to make a bigger or a smaller share of 
value added and employment in a given country. But they are anyway supposed to grow fast, no 
matter what. If this is not the case (and the negative productivity growth rate of about 3% per year 
in 2000-03 indicates that this is really not being the case in Italy), there are good reasons to be 
worried. Moreover, this contrasts with secular growth rates in these industries in the order of 
(positive) three per cent per year in the 1970s and the 1980s through 1995. 
So much is for manufacturing. The growth slowdown was unfortunately not restricted to 
manufacturing, however. As indicated in Table 3, labor productivity growth in business sector 
services also zeroed, going down to one half of a percentage point in 1995-2000 and negative 0.5% 
in 2000-03. This is bad news in two ways. First, productivity in this sector used to grow by roughly 
2% per year in the 1970s and about 1% in the 1980s through 1995. These are much lower figures 
than the corresponding figures for manufacturing, but they used to be positive anyway. 
But there is a second reason for concern. In recent years, productivity in business sector services 
(such as finance and TLC services, but also wholesale and, crucially, retail trade) in the US started 
growing very fast (by 3-4% per year), at odds with the past. The US data indicates that there was 
likely an available technology out there to be adopted. This chance has seemingly not been grabbed 
– for reasons to be investigated - by Italian service companies. The prevailing idea (see Triplett and 
Bosworth, 2003) is that the “Baumol disease” puzzle has been solved in the US where, in the 
second half of the 1990s, labor productivity in traditionally slow-growing industries (such as retail 
trade and finance) began growing fast. Thinking it through, Baumol’s theory was breached in Italy   11
as well, but in the opposite direction than in the US: rather than transforming the service sector in a 
fast-growing industry, it was manufacturing which stopped growing fast. Unfortunately, private 
services have not taken over manufacturing as the new engine of growth. 
Finally, Table 3 also shows that, in the Italian economy, two industries exhibit positive growth of 
labor productivity in 1995-2003: agriculture and utilities. Yet these industries are small in terms of 
employment and therefore their good productivity performances cannot do much to reverse the 
overall productivity trends stemming from manufacturing and services. Moreover, the still positive 
productivity performance of agriculture in 1995-2003 is actually the result of a productivity 
slowdown as well, which leaves utilities as the only accelerating industry in the Italian economy. 
Indeed, agricultural productivity used to grow very fast in 1980-95 (+4.3% per year) and still in 
1995-2000 (+5.2%). In the most recent years, instead, agricultural productivity collapsed at about 
the same yearly rates as productivity in durable goods producing industries. 
The accelerating growth in the industry producing (formerly) public utilities such as electricity, gas 
and water came about after decades of stagnating productivity. The disappointing productivity 
performance in these industries was indeed at the root of the repeated privatization episodes 
undertaken in such industries in the 1990s. The result of such episodes seemingly materialized in 
revived growth rates of labor productivity in 1995-2003. This acceleration was even more 
pronounced in 2000-03 than in 1995-00. Whether this apparent productivity acceleration is really 
productivity and not something else remains to be seen in the next sections. 
Summing up, the declining productivity performance of the Italian economy is rooted in a rather 
sharp and generalized worsening of the productivity performance of all the main industries, with the 
exception of utilities. 
 
 
4. The labor productivity slowdown across industries: within versus 
reallocation effects 
 
The evidence in the previous sections does not say whether the recorded labor productivity 
slowdown is the result of insufficient reallocation of resources away from backward or slow-
growing industries or if it instead comes about as the loss of dynamism of industries which used to 
grow fast in the past. Understanding which one of these hypotheses is borne by the data adds to our 
understanding of Italy’s decline. Providing such an answer is the goal of this section. 
 
4.1 Decomposing labor productivity growth in within and between components 
Any given industry may contribute to aggregate productivity growth in two ways.   12
Suppose first that the level of labor productivity in industry j is the same as the economy-wide 
average. Then aggregate labor productivity growth is simply the weighted average of each 
industry’s labor productivity growth, with the industry fixed weights equal to the nominal value 
added shares in some base (usually initial) year. In this economy, the higher the growth rate of 
productivity in each individual industry, the higher the growth rate of productivity in the aggregate. 
This is the within-effect of industry productivity growth on aggregate productivity growth. In this 
economy, resource reallocation across industries would not affect the growth rate of aggregate 
productivity, for there would be no efficiency gains to reap from such reallocation. 
If instead, as is regularly the case in most countries, the various industries differ as to levels or 
growth rates of productivity, then resource reallocation across industries does have an impact on 
aggregate productivity, holding other things constant. This reallocation (or “between” industries) 
effect may positively contribute to aggregate growth if industry j is expanding (respectively, 
contracting) employment/hours worked and, in parallel, its level or growth rate of productivity is 
higher (respectively, lower) than the economy-wide average. In this case, the reallocation effect is 
positive. If labor moves to industries less productive (or growing at a slower pace) than the average, 
the reallocation effect is instead negative. Hence, the growth rate of aggregate productivity may still 
be higher in Italy than, say, in France, even if all of Italy’s and France’s industries grow at the same 
pace, as long as, in Italy, labor moves away from low-productivity (or low-growth) into high-
productivity (or high-growth) industries, while this does not occur in France. 
Following this line of reasoning, we have broken down the growth rate of Italy’s aggregate labor 
productivity at various instants of time into its industry contributions and three industry-specific 
components, namely the “within” effect, “level reallocation” effect and “growth reallocation” effect 
described in words above. The formula to implement such decomposition is from Gozzi, Grossi, 
Ganugi and Gagliardi (2005) - in turn, a modified version of the decomposition in Baily, 
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where LPit is the level of labor productivity in industry i (aggregate if industry index is missing) at 
time t and wjt is the employment share in industry j at time t. The first summation on the right-hand 
side is the within effect, the second summation is the level reallocation effect and the third 
summation is the growth reallocation effect. The j
th component of the three pieces of the equation 
above represents the overall contribution of industry j to aggregate productivity growth. This   13
contribution stems from its growth rate of productivity weighted by its initial year employment 
share plus the reallocation of employment to above-average or below-average productivity 
industries (second component) and the reallocation of employment to above-average or below-
average productivity growth industries. The two reallocation components together are usually called 
“between-effects”. 
 
4.2 Decomposition results 
Learning about the relative extent of each component of the formula in previous sub-section is a 
potentially useful addition to our understanding of the causes of Italy’s growth slowdown. Hence 
we implemented the above decomposition for 1970-80, 1980-95, 1995-03, 1995-00 and 2000-03. 
The results for 1980-95 and 1995-03 are reported in Table 4 below. 
Two caveats before looking at the numbers. First, being the reported figures the cumulated growth 
over the period rather than the compounded average growth, the figures in the two panels should be 
compared keeping in mind that 1995-2003 involves about half as much the number of years as 
1980-95. Second, the reallocation we are speaking about here is exclusively the shift of workers 
between industries. By construction, the within-industry reallocation between firms – clearly the 
most sizable inter-firm flow of workers - is not looked at here. 
9 
Table 4 and 5 nicely sum up a few, well known and less well known, facts on Italy’s pattern of 
growth. 
As discussed in the previous section, 1980-95 was a period of relatively fast growth for labor 
productivity in the Italian economy (compared to the next decade, at least). The cumulated growth 
of labor productivity over this period of time was slightly above 31% (see column [4] in the 
leftmost panel in Table 4). In 1995-03, instead, the cumulated growth of labor productivity was a 
bare 5.1% (see column [8]) – about one third of the expected cumulated growth had productivity 
grown at the same rate as in 1980-95. 
In 1980-95, manufacturing and business sector services provided the main boost to the aggregate 
growth of labor productivity, though in different ways. 
The contribution of manufacturing (about 13 percentage points overall) was entirely of a within-
type, for the – rather small anyway - level and growth reallocation effects essentially offset each 
other for this sector.
10 The cumulative growth of thirteen percentage points over fifteen years 
corresponds to yearly contributions of some 0.8 percentage points, in turn approximately the 
                                                 
9 On the role of between-firm reallocation, see Bartelsman, Scarpetta and Schivardi (2003). 
10 The productivity contribution of manufacturing is the sum of the within and between contributions of ten 
manufacturing industries, seven of which producing non-durables and three producing durables.   14
product of a growth rate of about 2.8% per year times the initial manufacturing share in FTE 
employment of about 28% in 1980 (2.8 p.p. times 0.28 equals .0784 p.p.). 
Table 4 – Within and between effects in aggregate and industry labor productivity growth 
  1980-95 1995-03 


















[1] [2]  [3] [4]  [5] [6]  [7]  [8] 
Total 
0.255 0.085  -0.027 0.313  0.039 0.018  -0.005  0.051 
Agriculture 
0.037 0.042  0.002 0.081  0.008 0.011  -0.001  0.017 
Mining 
0.005 -0.001  -0.001 0.003  0.000  0.000  0.000  -0.001 
Manufacturing  0.129 0.009  -0.008 0.129  0.004 0.000  0.000  0.005 
non-durables  0.092 0.006  -0.007 0.092 0.004 0.000  0.000 0.004
durables  0.036 0.002  -0.002 0.037 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000
Utilities 
0.003 0.001  0.000 0.004  0.012 -0.004  -0.003  0.005 
Construction 
0.011 0.001  0.002 0.014  0.000 -0.001  0.000  -0.001 
Business sector 
services  0.075 0.034  -0.004 0.105  0.005 0.011  -0.001  0.015 
Public services  -0.005 -0.001  -0.017 -0.023  0.009  0.002  0.000 0.011 
Note: The definitions of within, level  reallocation and growth reallocation effects are given in the main text 
Source: own calculations from OECD STAN data 
 
 
Table 5 – Growth of total full time equivalent employment, 1970-2003, main industry  groups 
  1970-80 1980-95 1995-03  1995-00 2000-03 
Economy  1.0 0.1 0.9  0.8 1.1 
Agriculture  -2.3 -3.9 -3.0  -3.7 -1.9 
Manufacturing  1.2 -1.3 0.1  0.1 0.0 
-- non-durables       0.7       -1.4       0.0       0.0       0.0 
-- durables       2.3       -1.2       0.3       0.4       0.0 
Utilities  0.6 0.4  -3.1  -2.5 -4.2 
Construction  -1.5 -0.8 1.7  0.8 3.4 
Business sector services  2.5 1.7 2.1  2.2 2.0 
Public services  2.6 1.6 0.6  0.3 0.8 
Source: own calculations from OECD STAN data   15
 
 
Source: own calculations from OECD STAN data 
 
The “within” effect also made three fourths of the total contribution of market services to aggregate 
productivity growth (10.5 percentage points overall). This (7.5 percentage points) was the result of 
a lower growth rate (+1.1% annually) and a slightly higher - and increasing - employment share 
than in manufacturing. The data in Table 4 also indicate that, unlike for manufacturing, a good one 
fourth of the contribution of market services to aggregate productivity growth (three percentage 
points) came about in the form of a level reallocation effect. 
What happened then in 1980-95? Two things: deindustrialization and tertiarization. As in Table 5 
and Figure 3 (where, respectively the growth rates of FTE employment and the industry levels of 
labor productivity in 1970-2003 are depicted), manufacturing employment has been reallocated 
away to other industries or to the unemployment pool, at a rate of 1.3 percentage points per year. In 
contrast, employment in market services grew by about 1.7% per year in this period, mainly thanks 
to the increased shares of “wholesale and retail trade” and “other business services” over total 
employment. 
These developments materialized in positive contributions to productivity growth (partly at variance 
with the presumption of Baumol’s cost disease theory) on both sides, because at least some 
Figure 3
Industry labor productivity levels in Italy 
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manufacturing employment has fled low-productivity non-durable-producing industries to head to 
high-productivity finance, real estate and properly said business services.
11 
The reallocation contribution to productivity growth was also importantly complemented by the 
agricultural sector. In 1980-95, the contribution of agriculture to productivity growth has remained 
substantial to about 8 percentage points, making up about one fourth of the aggregate productivity 
increase. This contribution is roughly equally split into the within and the between effects, which 
respectively totaled 3.7 and 4.2 percentage points. As in previous years, the level reallocation effect 
has been remarkably high for low-productivity agriculture. As apparent in Table 5 and Figure 3, 
any of the alternative employment destinations would be a more productive use of workers’ time 
than staying in agriculture. 
To sum up, the labor productivity data for the Italian economy in 1980-95 describe an economy 
undergoing a process of structural change roughly in line with those experimented by other 
countries earlier on or in parallel. 
This picture has dramatically changed in the last ten years, though. As explained in previous 
sections, aggregate productivity growth declined sharply as result of declining growth in almost all 
industries. Here we can be more precise about whether such declining trends at the industry level 
have been driven by within or between forces. 
The decline in manufacturing productivity has indeed been mainly due to the “within” component, 
in the same fashion as former contribution of manufacturing to aggregate productivity was of a 
within-type. In 1980-95, manufacturing used to contribute almost thirteen percentage points to 
aggregate productivity growth. In 1995-2003, its contribution fell to a bare (cumulated!) one half of 
a percentage point, almost entirely coming from non-durable goods production. The reduced 
contribution from manufacturing represents about one half of the aggregate productivity slowdown. 
In short, in 1995-2003, everything was astonishingly zeroed in manufacturing productivity. The 
zeroing of the within component means the loss of positive productivity contributions of nine and 
three percentage points, respectively, from non-durable and durable goods production. This got 
compounded with the continued decline of non-durable production in total FTE employment. 
The outright zeroing of the reallocation component for manufacturing has mainly to do with the end 
of the release of manufacturing labor onto other sectors: while the growth of employment had 
stayed negative in excess of 1% in 1980-95, it became zero in 1995-03. 
                                                 
11 Table 5 also shows the continuing rise in public sector employment. This is another part of the tertiarization process, 
but unfavorable to productivity growth, however, through the growth reallocation component (visible as well in Table 
4). It should be kept in mind, though, that the productivity contribution of the “public sector services” item is, by 
definition, very imperfectly captured (to say the least), given the non-market nature of most services supplied by the 
public sector.   17
The declining productivity performance in market services has also given a sizable contribution to 
the productivity slowdown for cumulated nine percentage points. Given the cumulated contribution 
of 10.5 percentage points in 1980-95, one would expect about half as much over a period long one 
half. Instead, market services have barely contributed a cumulated 1.5 percentage points in eight 
years. This decline has come for about seven points from “within” forces and for two points from 
“between” forces. The productivity contribution from the level reallocation effect is thus much 
smaller (one percentage point as opposed to three) but still present.
12 In the light of the sharp 
declines observed for the within effects, such reallocation effects from services and agriculture have 
become major contributors to aggregate productivity growth in 1995-2003. 
Finally, the third main cause of the productivity slowdown has been agriculture, whose productivity 
contribution fell from 8 cumulative points in 1980-95 to 1.7 points, as a result of equally sharp 
declines of about three percentage points in the within and between effects. At variance with the 
other industries, “utilities” positively contributed to aggregate productivity growth due to its 
accelerating growth rate, although this positive within effect of about 1.2 percentage points has been 
partly offset (for about one half) by the negative reallocation component caused by the exit of 
workers (at the fast pace of -3.1% per year) from such high-productivity and high-growth industries. 
Altogether, as portrayed in Table 4, the relative extent of the “within” vs. “between” components 
has stayed rather similar in the two periods. The within-effect represents the bulk (more than 80%) 
of the recorded growth in aggregate productivity both in 1980-95 and 1995-03 (the same applies to 
the 1970s as well, whose data are not reported here). It is thus still broadly the case that Italy has 
grown fast or slowly as long as each of its industries has grown fast. The remaining 20% of total 
productivity growth – hence not a minor part – has been brought about by inter-industry labor 
reallocation, particularly by labor reallocation towards high-productivity industries. 
 
 
4.3 Conclusions on within vs. between effects 
The evidence on labor productivity growth across industries brings two main facts to bear. 
First, the declining growth of Italy’s labor productivity mainly finds its roots in declining growth of 
productivity in each industry, notably manufacturing, services and agriculture: about 80% of the 
total slowdown is due to the within components and only 20% to the between components. 
                                                 
12 It should be kept in mind that the level reallocation effect would be smaller had “real estate” been taken away from 
market services, as the OECD, in its guidelines on productivity measurement, recommends to do. The exclusion of real 
estate activities may well be motivated by the fact that the imputed rent of owner-occupied dwellings – an item outright 
unrelated to the business sector’s production function – is included with the properly stated business activities in the 
real estate sector for many countries under SNA93. Yet STAN does not unfortunately provide separate information as 
to real estate and other business service activities.   18
Second, the industry decomposition analysis also indicates important differences in the importance 
of within and between effects across industries. While the manufacturing decline has been almost 
exclusively of a within-type, the productivity slowdown in agriculture and market services has had 
an important reallocation component. This piece of evidence - further confirmed when analyzing 
the extent of between-firm within-industry reallocation - is somehow at odds with the common 
presumption on the rigidity of Italy’s labor markets. 
 
 
5. Labor productivity slowdown: capital deepening or TFP? 
 
The former sections clarified that Italy’s growth problem stems from declining labor productivity in 
manufacturing, services and agriculture and partly from diminished reallocation from agriculture 
into services. This was the second step in our analysis. In this section we go beyond and ask a third 
question: is Italy’s labor productivity slowdown due to reduced capital deepening or to declining 
TFP growth? 
This is a well-established question when analyzing productivity data. “Productivity”, in common 
parlance, is indeed “efficiency”. So far, however, we have looked at labor productivity, which is not 
a measure of efficiency in resource allocation. Labor productivity may in fact decline for either 
diminished efficiency in the use of labor or due to declining accumulation of capital per hour 
worked. In both cases, the productivity of the labor input falls, but this second circumstance may 
well be the counterpart of capital-labor substitution induced, in the economists’ jargon, by factor 
price changes along a given isoquant for an unchanged efficiency level. This is why economists, 
since Solow (1957), have struggled to construct measures of properly said efficiency – the most 
common of which is total factor productivity (TFP). 
In what follows, we decompose the observed growth slowdown in industry labor productivity in 
diminished TFP growth and capital deepening to clarify whether an efficiency problem or 
something else underlies Italy’s productivity slowdown. 
 
 
5.1 TFP measurement: assumptions and definitions 
Our TFP industry data draw on the OECD STAN database and from ISTAT – National Accounts.
13 
We compute TFP under the standard assumptions of constant returns to scale and perfect 
competition in factor and product markets, using moving-averaged (at times t and t-1) value added 
                                                 
13 See the Appendix for a more detailed data description.   19
shares to compute the contribution of productive capital
14 and labor. The value added share of labor 
is corrected for self-employment. These are possibly questionable but commonly used assumptions 
that we do not further discuss here.
15 
Moreover, when it comes to market services, measuring TFP becomes an even more contentious 
issue, as famously pointed by Zvi Griliches who defined services “hard-to-measure activities” and 
recently discussed by Stiroh (2002) with reference to the role of financial intermediation in the US 
productivity revival of the 1990s. Once again, we do take our primary data for granted in this 
respect too. 
When computing TFP, the OECD secretariat employs harmonized price deflators to evaluate the 
contribution of IT capital to aggregate productivity. From Schreyer (2000), this is a shortcut to 
tackle the quality-adjustment issue in the absence of hedonically adjusted prices. 
The same procedure is not followed by the OECD and ISTAT (whose data we employ here) when 
computing the industry price indices employed to produce constant price items in STAN. This is 
like saying that the capital deepening computed by the OECD Secretariat is meant to first-hand 
proxy for capital quality, while the OECD-ISTAT data are not.  
While we discuss some of these issues at more length in section 6.2.2 for sensitivity analysis 
purposes, for the time being, any change in the quality of labor (through education and training) and 
capital (through machine-embodied technical change) is collapsed in our industry TFP measures, 




5.2 Industry TFP growth and capital deepening 
Table 6 presents data for TFP growth and capital deepening and Table 7 for the growth of capital-
labor ratios following the same industry and time breakdown as in Table 4, except that the 1970s 
column is left empty (productive capital stock data are missing for that decade). 
Concentrate on the economy as a whole first. From the leftmost panel of Table 6, one learns that 
Italy’s TFP growth essentially zeroed in 1995-03, down by a full percentage point with respect to 
1980-95. This TFP growth reduction – a notable change compared to the past - is the bulk of the 
reduction in labor productivity growth experienced in the same period (-1.2 percentage points, 
down from 1.8% per year in the 1980s to 0.6% in 1995-03). 
                                                 
14 “Productive capital” is the stock of capital stock after super-imposing an age-related efficiency decline path that 
varies depending on the type of capital good. 
15 In a recent paper, Marchetti and Nucci (2004) cannot reject the assumption of constant returns to scale in the Italian 
manufacturing industries. 
16 We also re-computed TFP after correcting the labor input for labor quality measure provided by Brandolini and 
Cipollone (2004) for the whole economy. As expected, the TFP netted of labor quality improvements is lower than 
otherwise. But this simply reinforces our main result – that the overall productivity decline is mainly a TFP matter.   20
In the rightmost part of Table 6, capital deepening (i.e. the product of the growth of the capital-
labor ratio - the ratio between productive capital stocks and the number of full-time equivalent 
employed persons - and the value added share of capital at t and t-1) is shown not to have decreased 
much for the economy as a whole, with a slight rounding down from 0.8 percentage points in 1980-
95 to 0.6 percentage points in 1995-2003. Hence, the reduction of labor productivity growth for 
about 1.2 percentage points is accounted for by TFP growth reduction for about 1% and capital 
deepening by a mere 0.2%. 
 
Table 6 – TFP growth and capital deepening, 1980-2003, main industry groups 
    TFP growth  K deepening 
















Economy  -  1.0 0.0 0.5 -0.7 0.8 0.6  0.6  0.5 
Agriculture  -  2.8 0.5 2.7 -3.2 1.5 2.2  2.5  1.7 
Manufacturing  -  1.7 -0.5 0.3 -1.8 1.3 0.7 0.7 0.8 
-- non-durables  -        1.9       -0.5    -0.2    -1.0       1.2         0.8      0.9        0.8 
-- durables  -        1.3       -0.5     1.3    -3.4        1.4        0.5      0.4      0.7  
Utilities  -  -0.6 3.0 1.6 5.6 1.4 2.5  2.1  3.1 
Construction  -  0.2 -0.6 -0.2 -1.2 0.8  0.7 0.7 0.7 
Business sector 
services 
-  0.2 -0.4 0.0 -1.1 0.9 0.5 0.5 0.6 
Source: own calculations from STAN data 
 
This close correlation between labor productivity and TFP (and, in parallel, the diverging behavior 
of capital deepening and labor productivity) becomes even more evident in the recent period, when 
the labor productivity slowdown has turned into an outright decline. During 2000-2003, when labor 
productivity growth fell to -0.2 percentage points per year, TFP growth literally collapsed to -0.7 
percentage points, while the productivity contribution of capital per worker gently went down from 
0.6 in 1995-2000 to 0.5 percentage points in 2000-03. 
Why has the reduction in capital deepening been so mild in 1995-2003 and, within 1995-2003, in 
2000-03? This may be for two reasons: a declining factor share of capital, while the growth of the 
capital-labor ratio has continued unabatedly, or declining accumulation rates of capital per FTE 
employed for unchanged or even increased factor shares (or both). 
The evidence in Table 7, where the growth rates of industry capital-labor ratios are reported, is 
consistent with the latter hypothesis. The 1980-95 value added share of capital implicit in the capital   21
deepening calculation was 0.3 (0.8 percentage points divided by 2.7 percentage points, the growth 
rate of the capital-labor ratio), but then it went up considerably (to about 0.4) in 1995-2003. Hence, 
this upward trend in the factor share of capital almost offset the declining accumulation rates of 
capital per worker (which fell from 2.8% to 1.5%). Torrini (2005) has further decomposed the 
evolution of the capital (or profit) shares into the evolution of their two basic components, the 
capital-value added ratio and the imputed rate of return on capital. It turns out that the 1995-2000 
increase in the value added share is entirely accounted for by rising capital-value added ratios, while 
rates of returns have declined (see Graph 6, 7 and 8 in his paper). 
In 1995-2003, instead, the value added share of capital stayed constant between the first half and the 
second half of the period, while capital accumulation slowed down a little bit (from 1.6% to 1.3%). 
This produced the only mild slowdown in capital deepening from 0.6 to 0.5 percentage points. 
 
Table 7 – Growth of capital-labor ratios, 1980-2003, main industry groups 
  1970-80 1980-95 1995-03  1995-00  2000-03 
Economy  -  2.7 1.5  1.6  1.3 
Agriculture  -  5.5 4.3  5.1  3.1 
Manufacturing  -  3.8 2.3  2.3  2.2 
-- non-durables  -       3.5       2.4       2.5         2.2 
-- durables  -       4.6        2.0       1.8         2.4 
Utilities  -  2.9 3.5  3.1  4.2 
Construction  -  2.0 1.9  2.2  1.6 
Business sector services  -  2.0 1.0  0.9  1.1 
Source: own calculations from OECD STAN and ISTAT National Accounts 
 
So much is for the big picture. Next we provide a more detailed description of TFP and capital 
deepening at the industry level. It turns out that the close correlation between labor productivity and 
TFP (and the related implications for the behavior of the value added shares of capital) is 
particularly evident in manufacturing. 
To start with, the TFP data in Table 6 show outright negative figures for all industries but one 
(utilities) in the 1995-2003 columns and positive figures in the 1980s column (but one: utilities, 
again). Although the sudden and abrupt zeroing of TFP growth rates was generalized, this was 
particularly striking for agriculture and manufacturing. In these sectors, TFP used to grow fast at the 
rates of, respectively, 2.8% and 1.7% per year, in 1980-95. Productivity in “market services” has   22
never grown fast, instead: these industries simply suffered from the continuation of past 
productivity stagnation. 
Manufacturing In 1995-2003, manufacturing TFP declined by about half a percentage point per 
year, equally for non-durable and durable producers, and not too dissimilarly from constructions 
and market services. Such a decline was particularly sizable for the industries producing non-
durable goods in 1995-00: in these industries, TFP growth fell to -0.2% per year in 1995-2000 from 
+1.9% in 1980-95. TFP growth stayed instead roughly constant at about +1.3% in 1995-2000 for 
durable producers, but then markedly fell to -3.4% in 2000-03. This scattered timing of declines 
quite closely matches labor productivity developments in these industries. This piece of evidence 
thus closely mirrors the evidence presented above for the economy as a whole. 
Non-durable goods producing industries include producers of consumer and intermediate goods, 
with the production of intermediates (notably chemicals and pharmaceuticals) being the fastest 
growing industries in the Italian economy in 1980-95. This was no longer the case in 1995-03, 
when TFP growth zeroed in chemicals (from 6% in the previous years). More generally, the growth 
debacle has been striking in all the Made-in-Italy consumer industries, such as “Textiles and 
Wearing”, “Leather, leather products and Footwear”, “Wood and wood products”, although timing 
and intensity of the growth reduction was somehow different in the various industries. The decline 
in “Leather and Footwear” has been unusually abrupt in 1995-00 (falling to -1.7%, from 2.5% in 
1980-95) and much deeper than in the other “Made-in-Italy” industries in 2000-03, where a decline 
of 4.3% per year was recorded. 
In industries producing durable goods, as mentioned above, TFP kept growing in the second half of 
the 1990s, but then it fell more dramatically than in the rest of the manufacturing sector in the first 
years of the 2000s. In the production of machinery and equipment (which includes many of the 
industries traditionally classified among the high-tech industries), TFP fell by 4.4% per year in 
2000-03 – a cumulated decline of about 14% in three years. This was mainly driven by the negative 
6.4% per year in the production of electrical and optical equipment – the industry including, among 
other things, the production of personal computers and cellular phones (whose diffusion has, in 
contrast, proceeded at a very fast pace over this period). 
In many such industries, capital-labor ratios increased faster than labor productivity, in parallel with 
sharp TFP declines. This is consistent with the aggregate evidence of rising value added shares of 
capital and rising capital-output ratios. The steadiness in the growth of capital-labor ratios in non-
durable and durable manufacturing throughout 1995-2003 is particularly striking. In this period of 
time, in these industries the growth of labor productivity zeroed or became negative, but the capital-
labor ratios continued to grow at about the same rates as in 1995-00 and 1980-95. This applies to   23
textiles, leather and footwear and chemicals. All of these industries are examples of particularly 
abrupt declines in TFP growth and particularly sharp increases in the value added share of capital; 
in these industries, however, capital-labor ratios continued to grow by 3-4% per year, slightly - but 
only slightly - below the growth rates in 1980-95. This is in line with the result of a growth 
accounting exercise carried out by Bassanetti, Iommi, Jona-Lasinio and Zollino (2004) where it was 
shown that declining TFP came about with a growing contribution of capital to manufacturing 
output growth in 1996-2001 compared to previous years. 
Understandably, manufacturing companies continued to invest in the booming years of 1995-2000. 
Less easily understandable, the investment process continued even in the face of en economy-wide 
collapse. Yet, when contrasted with rising value added shares of capital, this is again entirely 
rational. 
Agriculture TFP growth in agriculture stayed roughly constant at 2.7-2.8% from 1980 through 2000 
before the sudden decline in 2000-03, when the average growth rate became negative as well (-
3.2% per year). The high productivity growth in the past had been the result of continuing 
modernization and adoption of new techniques in the agricultural sector. This process has 
seemingly come to a halt in recent years. In the same fashion as in manufacturing, capital 
accumulation continued in 1995-2000 and 2000-03 (although at a somewhat lower pace). This is 
mirrored in the evolution of the (implicit) value added shares of capital, which reached almost one 
half of the value added in 1995-2003 (up from 27% in 1980-95). 
Market services Leaving the still unsolved measurement issues aside, the decline in TFP growth in 
market services from roughly zero in the 1980s and the 1990s to negative figures in 2000-03 are 
simply the continuation of past stagnation in these sectors. 
This is certainly true for traditional low-productivity tertiary industries such as wholesale and retail 
trade (in short, trade). It also applies, but to a lesser extent, to other industries more directly affected 
by the IT revolution and the privatization processes going on during these years, such as finance, 
which includes banks, insurance companies and financial intermediation. 
In wholesale and retail trade, TFP growth fell from the modest growth rates in the 1980s (hovering 
around one half of a percentage point per year) to negative growth of half a percentage point in the 
second half of the 1990s, further lowered to minus two per cent per year in 2000-03. It should be 
kept in mind, however, that this further deceleration is common to Germany and France and has 
instead been paralleled by accelerating productivity in these same industries in the US (due to the 
well-known productivity wonders of Wal-Mart, Home Depot and other low-price retailing giants). 
In the financial sector, confirming the potential measurement issues that make it hard to link 
productivity developments to movements along the production function in these industries, TFP   24
growth reached +3.5% per year in the years of the Internet bubble (1995-2000) and then became 
negative for about 1.3% per year in 2000-03, when financial markets left on the ground the bulk of 
the rally gains of the previous five years. Altogether, in 1995-2003, the growth rate of “TFP” in the 
financial sector averaged +1.7% per year. 
Interestingly,  Table 6 shows that, in the booming years of 1995-2000, the labor productivity 
slowdown in market services has been driven by capital deepening, rather than TFP. This is quite 
different from the manufacturing evidence described above. In the more recent years (2000-03), 
instead, the sharply downward trend of TFP led labor productivity once again. 
Why was 1995-2000 different from previous and subsequent years in market services? The main 
piece of evidence in Table 7 is that the growth of the capital-labor ratios declined substantially in 
market services compared to 1980-95, while the value added share of capital has gone up less 
sizably than in manufacturing. This was at odds with the rest of the economy. Why was it that 
capital-labor ratios slowed down earlier and more markedly in market services than in 
manufacturing? 
One possibility is that, as a result of the introduction of piecemeal labor market reform in 1997-98 
(the so called “Treu package” legislation), new types of part-time and temporary workers entered 
the labor market, taking jobs disproportionately more in those market service industries whose labor 
demand is probably tilted in favor of such relatively un-experienced workers. Within the highly 
heterogeneous “market services”, such low-skill industries are “wholesale and retail trade”, “hotels 
and restaurants”, and possibly “real estate activities”, while “transports, storage and 
communications“, “finance” and “other business activities” are usually classified among those with 
a relatively skilled labor demand. 
ISTAT has published data on the compositional changes in the labor force distinguished by gender 
and by type of contract over the last ten years or so.
 17 It turns out that, in the last ten years or so, 
compositional changes in the Italian labor market have been substantial.  
In 1996-2003, the employment of full-time workers increased on average by 1%, while the part-
time share rose by 2.4%. The rise of part-time employment is partly accounted for by the rapidly 
rising participation of women to the labor market and, notably a growing female share in total 
employment (it reached 39% of the total in 2003, up from 35% in 1993). All in all, in 1996-2003, 
the share of females taking advantage of part-time increased by 3.8%, while the male share 
decreased by 1%. The remaining part of the story is of course the remarkable increase of temporary 
contracts, especially among women, resorting to this kind of contract mainly during the second half 
of the decade (15% vs 11% of male). Moreover, again probably in connection with the revision of 
                                                 
17 See http://www.istat.it/lavoro/lavret/forzedilavoro/Ricostruzione-serie.htm   25
the norm regulating the contract of apprentices (Law 24 June 1997, n.196), the incidence of 
apprentices over total employment had risen to 2.8% as of 2002, up from 1.5% in 1992. 
Although all such pieces of evidence testify the relevance of the structural changes undergone by 
the Italian labor market during these years, the available productivity data does not, however, first-
hand indicate that the dynamics of the capital-labor ratios have been driven by labor market reform 
and the ensuing compostional changes in the labor force. In “Wholesale and retail trade”, the pace 
of labor productivity indeed fell from +1.7% in 1980-95 to +0.4% in 1995-03 (+1.1% in 1995-
2000), but this is mainly accounted for by a corresponding reduction in TFP growth, not by 
lessened capital deepening. In “Hotels and restaurants”, labor productivity growth actually 
increased from the 1980s to the 1990s, going up from -1.2% per year in 1980-95 to +0.1% in 1995-
2003 (+0.8% in 1995-2000). The same applies to “real estate”, where the negative growth of labor 
productivity for about negative two percentage points in the 1980s turned into a less negative 
number in the second half of the 1990s. In the three industries more likely candidates to receive the 
labor supply shock, this has seemingly not ostensibly materialized.
18 
Why then, when looking at “market services”, do we see in parallel lower capital deepening and 
labor productivity? We don’t have productive capital stocks at the three-digit level and are thus 
unable to provide a full-fledged answer. But even sticking to what we can get a handle of, namely 
labor productivity, evidence exists that the labor productivity slowdown in “transports, storage and 
communications” is half accounted by a TFP reduction and half by a reduction in capital deepening. 
Moreover, the residual item in the “other business service activities” (once “real estate” is taken 
away) is a heterogeneous item which also includes, however, a large fraction of the so called 
“advanced tertiary” sector (R&D, computer and software consulting, legal activities). The most 
dynamic part of this patchwork of industries has shown rising growth of labor productivity and 
capital-labor ratios over the 1990s, which makes it a rather implausible candidate to account for the 
observed reduction in capital deepening. In the end, given that “communication services” has 
clearly been a productivity accelerating industry in 1995-2000, “transports” (land, water, air 
transport and the related supporting activities; about 5% of FTE employment) is left as the only 
candidate for driving down the capital deepening of market services as a whole in 1995-2000. 
Utilities Finally, in the same fashion as for labor productivity and at variance with the rest of the 
economy, the utilities industry showed accelerating TFP growth over time, up from -0.6% in the 
1980s to +1.6% in 1995-00, and eventually further up to +5.6% in 2000-03. This came about in 
parallel with accelerating growth of the capital-labor ratios and rising value added shares of capital. 
Whether this has more to do with shifts of the production function or, rather, with the extra-profits 
                                                 
18 This point is further discussed below in section 6.2.2, where the changing composition of employment is related to 
the measurement of TFP growth.   26
arising in privatized quasi-monopolistic markets is an open issue. Torrini (2005) presents evidence 
of how the increased value added share of capital in the 1990s has essentially originated in the non-
manufacturing part of the economy, particularly in those industries where privatization has taken 
place, whose main case in point is clearly utilities. 
 
5.3 Summing up on capital deepening vs. TFP 
Taken together, the facts described in this section drive one to three main conclusions: 
1.  Most of Italy’s labor productivity slowdown is due to TFP. This result is consistent with the 
findings from previous work and data sets (Daveri, 2002, 2004; Bassanetti, Iommi, Jona-
Lasinio and Zollino, 2004) 
2.  The TFP growth decline of the last ten years is particularly apparent in (but not restricted to) 
the manufacturing sector 
3.  The value added share of capital has gone up in the last few years, particularly in 1995-2000 
and particularly in manufacturing and in the industries producing utilities. This counteracted 
declining capital accumulation and explains the only mild decline in capital deepening. 
 
6. Extensions 
In this section we investigate how our main results are affected by some of the simplifying 
assumptions necessary to carry out TFP calculations at the industry level with the data set we are 
endowed with. 
A first issue is to what extent what we call TFP has really to do with the production function and 
not with the observed pro-cyclicality of productivity data. A second issue is whether the omission of 
quality improvements from the productivity contributions of each factor of production is biasing our 
conclusions. Third, it might be that what we call declining productivity in manufacturing is at least 
partly the side-effect of the declining productivity performance of market services. 
We discuss each of these issues in turn in separate sub-sections. 
 
6.1 TFP and business cycles 
Although the residual nature of TFP and the restrictiveness of the assumptions necessary to 
compute it makes linking the short-term fluctuations of TFP growth to production functions a 
particularly risky undertaking, a decade-long decline of this size is probably to be taken seriously. 
Still, a well-known feature of published productivity data is their pro-cyclicality. Such a feature has 
been extensively documented and the potential biases introduced in the analysis by its neglected   27
consideration investigated (Hall, 1990) and made up for (Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo, 1995, 
1996, Baxter and Farr, 2001). 
The problem seems quite relevant here. We do see a productivity slowdown and, in parallel, a 
cyclical downswing. It is thus legitimate to wonder whether the recorded TFP is really a genuine 
(but perhaps unlikely as such) technical regress or if today’s productivity slowdown is at least partly 
driven by the unobserved factor hoarding often associated with cyclical downturns. 
While giving a full answer to this question is beyond the scope of this article, the data in Figure 4 
and  5 may provide some clues on a smaller but related issue, namely whether current TFP 
developments in manufacturing and market services are similar to TFP developments during 
previous downswings. 
Figure 4 reports the values of the manufacturing TFP index around cycle peaks for 2000, 1995, 
1991, 1980. 
19 The chronology of Italy’s cycles is taken from the ISAE chronology reported in 
Bruno and Otranto (2004). Figure 5 reports the same data for market services. In both pictures, the 
blue thick broken line represents the data from the latest downswing. 
Figure 4 and 5 show quite a bit of after-peak dissimilarity in the behavior of TFP. There is indeed 
no such a thing as an “average response of TFP” to the onset of a cyclical downturn. The post-1995 
slowdown did not negatively affect TFP in market services and lasted for just one year for 
manufacturing TFP, while the after-1991 recession was seemingly not there for both manufacturing 
and services TFP. 
Having said so, however, Figure 4 and 5 show that the post-2000 behavior of TFP is most similar 
to the post-1980 data for both manufacturing and market services TFP. Today’s slowdown has been 
softer during the first year, but then the slowdown in its second year gained momentum and became 
very similar to the TFP slowdown recorded in the 1980s. In its third year after the peak, though, 
manufacturing TFP slightly recovered, while instead the slowdown became even deeper in 2003. 
For a better understanding, the same pictures can be drawn for those industries which, in the 
description of the main productivity trends above, have been pinpointed as suffering the worst 
downfall in 2000-03. These are leather and footwear, chemicals and the electrical and optical 
instruments industries in manufacturing, and wholesale and retail trade in market services. 
Figure 6-9 provides the corresponding pictures for such industries. As above, the blue broken thick 
line indicates how TFP evolved during the most recent downturn. Note that pictures have been 
drawn with the same scale on the vertical axis to make them more easily comparable. The pictures 
deliver a clear message: manufacturing industries are faring much worse than in all previous 
downswings. 
                                                 
19 The data before 1980 are not reported because our TFP measures do not go backwards in time beyond 1980.   28
The broken lines in leather and electrical equipment (which includes most of the so called “high-
tech” industries) indicate TFP losses of about 15% in three years – much more pronounced than in 
any other previous slowdown. 
In chemicals, TFP declined only mildly compared to other manufacturing industries. (though former 
growth rates were about 6% per year). This is hardly good news, anyway. First of all, TFP in the 
chemicals industry used to grow at rates of 6% in 1980-95. Hence the sudden move to minus one 
per cent per year is worrisome anyway. Second, during the other slowdowns, TFP in chemicals 
actually increased – quite substantially in the 1980s. An explanation for this difference may be that 
two of the previous downswings came about in parallel with (or caused by) sudden oil price 
increases, which often benefits the chemicals industry, while this was not the case in 2000. It 
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Figure 5
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Figure 7
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Source for Figure 4-9: own calculations from OECD STAN 
 
Finally, the cyclical downturn is less apparent instead for wholesale and retail trade. Yet, as 
mentioned above, this is no reason for relief, given that, during two of the previous slowdowns, 
there was in fact no IT revolution with its potential productivity gains up for grab out there. This 
was instead the case in the 1990s. Once again, TFP in the trade industry fared better during the 1995 
slowdown than in the early 2000s. 
Altogether, the comparison with previous episodes suggests that the severity of the 2000s decline in 
manufacturing TFP does not seem to be of a cyclical nature. 
 
 
6.2 Factor quality improvements and TFP measurement 
 
As mentioned in section 5, our TFP calculation is also the unwanted result of the failure of current 
statistical practices to account for factor quality improvements. As time goes by, hand-writing 
machines have been taken over by computers and illiterate workers by educated workers. In 
parallel, the labor market reform of the late 1990s may have somewhat changed the composition of 
employment, by raising the fraction of un-experienced workers. Does this have a bearing on the 
measured TFP? The likely answer based on the currently available information is: most likely, yes, 
but the available data can only very imperfectly gauge these phenomena. In the next sub-sections,   32
we provide some evidence of the importance of such measurement errors for the measurement of 
TFP. 
 
6.2.1 Capital input 
 
Here we confine ourselves to providing one additional piece of evidence in this respect. We show 
how aggregate TFP growth is affected by using the so called Schreyer’s assumption of weak PPP 
(thus in growth rates), a way of accounting for improvements in the quality of capital. This is done 
by the OECD when computing TFP data in the OECD Productivity database. 
 
Box  1 – How the OECD computes TFP growth 
The OECD computes TFP growth by subtracting the growth of total inputs (capital and labor) 
weighted by their respective value added shares from the growth of total output (real GDP). The 
contribution of labor is computed by adjusting for the self-employment share otherwise not 
included in the total compensations of employees. The capital input is measured as the volume of 
capital services (S), assumed to be in a fixed proportion to the productive capital stock. Capital 
services are computed for seven different types of assets and aggregated to an overall rate of change 







i is the share of each asset in the total value of capital services Σi=1,..,7 (ut
iSt
i). In this 
expression, the value of capital services for each asset is measured by (ut
iSt
i) where ut
i is the 
Jorgensonian user cost price per unit of capital services and St
i is the quantity of capital services of 
type i in year t. This is the same as ISTAT. Unlike ISTAT, though, OECD economists also make an 
effort to account for quality improvements in high-tech capital goods. This is done following 
Schreyer (2000) by constructing “harmonized” deflator indices. This boils down to superimposing 
the behavior of the price deflator of IT investment goods in the US economy (where they are 
computed through hedonic methods for some specific items such as semiconductors and PCs) onto 
the same goods for other OECD countries (including Italy), after adjusting for differences in GDP 
deflator inflation. In the end, the nominal investment flows necessary to compute the capital stocks 
of each capital good through the perpetual inventory method are deflated through this newly 
constructed index instead of the officially published figures. The result is that, in the growth 
decomposition, capital deepening becomes bigger at the expense of TFP growth. 
 
 
The OECD productivity database (see Box 1) allows one to construct TFP measures and compare it 
with labor productivity, although the OECD data do not go backwards in time for TFP as much as 
for labor productivity (TFP data in the OECD productivity database are only available for 1984-
2003). 
Such data are summarized in Table 8 together with the STAN-ISTAT data employed in section 5 
and reported here for the sake of comparison. The conclusion is the same as above: Italy’s 
slowdown in labor productivity growth was prominently due to declining TFP growth.   33
As expected, by controlling for quality improvement in capital accumulation, a bigger fraction of 
labor productivity growth is now accounted for by capital deepening and less is left to TFP growth, 
the residual term in the Solow decomposition. But the time pattern remains the same. 
 
Table 8: Decomposing aggregate labor productivity growth with different data sets 
  OECD productivity database  OECD STAN + Istat 
  Growth of 
GDP per 
man hour 
K deepening (in 




Growth of GDP per 
FTE employed 
person 
K deepening (in 





(*)  2.2 0.9  1.3  1.8  0.8  1.0 
1995-03 0.4  0.7  -0.3  0.6  0.6  0.0 
1995-00 0.9  0.9  0.1  1.1  0.6  0.5 
2000-03 -0.3  0.5  -0.7  -0.2  0.5  -0.7 
(*) 1980-95, with OECD-STAN + ISTAT data 
Source: OECD productivity database and OECD/STAN and ISTAT 
 
In the years between 1995 and 2003, TFP growth still falls dramatically. With the quality-adjusted 
data, TFP levels end up falling by 0.3% per year, while the contribution of capital to labor 
productivity growth remains positive, with only a slight decline to 0.7 percentage points per year 
(down from 0.9 percentage points). This trend is very similar to the trend observed in the data 
reported in the rightmost panel of Table 8, based on quality-unadjusted data. 
Interestingly, in the OECD Productivity database, the same decomposition of labor productivity 
growth is carried out for other OECD countries. Such comparative data for other European 
countries indicate that, in 1995-2003, Italy and Spain shared the unpleasant record of exhibiting 
virtually zero growth of TFP, with a contribution of capital deepening to labor productivity growth 
close to one percentage point per year - about the same as two other big European countries 
(Germany and France) and the US. Differences in productivity per hour worked in the OECD are 
mostly accounted for by differences in TFP growth, though: not by chance, the really fast-growing 
countries (Ireland, Finland, and Greece as well) exhibit TFP growth rates close to or above 2% per 
year (with Ireland showing an astonishingly high +4.4%). 
 
6.2.2 Labor input 
Now we show how TFP and labor productivity growth is influenced by the adoption of a quality-
adjusted labor input measure. There is a long  history of measures of labor input that reflect changes 
in labor quality due to the changes in the age, sex and education composition of workers 
(Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh, 2005). There have also been different approaches to explicit   34
differentiation of labor input according to how skills are measured (OECD, 2001). One possibility is 
to use characteristics such as age, health occupation and gender to cross-classify labor input 
(Jorgenson et al, 1987) or to assume a direct relation between skills and occupations and rank 
occupations by their skill intensity (OECD, 1998). This latter is the approach followed by 
Baldassarini and Di Veroli (2005) to obtain a labor quality measure both at the aggregate and at the 
industry level for Italian economy in 1993-2003.  
They derive a quality-adjusted labor input by differentiating professional qualifications of registered 
employees (distinguished between managers, white collars, blue collars and apprentices), 
unregistered employees, registered and unregistered self-employed workers
20. Each group is 
weighted by its corresponding share in total labor compensations.
21 
Employing the data they have kindly provided us with (and thus implicitly following their 
methodology to evaluate the contribution of quality improvements in the labor input), we compute a 
labor-quality-adjusted measure of TFP and labor productivity. 
Results conform to expectations: as shown in Figure 10, controlling for quality changes in the labor 
input slices out another bit of the former productivity residual thoughout the entire period. The time 
pattern of TFP growth remains the same, though. 
Figure 10 
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Source: own calculations from ISTAT National Accounts 
 
                                                 
20 See Baldassarini  and Pascarella (2003) for a description of the method adopted by ISTAT to identify unregistered 
workers and the underground economy at large. 
21 See Baldassarini and DiVeroli (2005) for a methodological description.   35
The observed increase in the average quality of the labor input employed in production implies that 
a quality adjusted measure of labor input would rise faster than an unadjusted measure. Holding the 
growth rate of GDP constant, this results in lower growth of labor productivity. This is what we see 
in Figure 11, where the growth rates of labor productivity, both adjusted and unadjusted for quality, 
are reported. The lower rates of growth of adjusted labor productivity indicate the extent of the 
quality improvements in the composition of the labor force occurred throughout this period of time. 
Figure 11 
Unadjusted Labor Productivity vs Adjusted Labor Productivity
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Source: own calculations from ISTAT National Accounts 
 
The data on the composition of FTE by type of employment (Table 9 in Baldassarini and Di Veroli, 
2005) show that, during the nineties, the composition of employment has been subject to a deep 
transformation, with the employment share of the white collars going up by about two percentage 
points (from 21.8% in 1992 to 23.6% in 2002). On the other hand, the share of the blue collars – 
traditionally identified as the least qualified workers in the labor force - declined by 1.3 percentage 
points all over the period. The data on the income shares by type of FTE (Table 8, in Baldassarini, 
Di Veroli, 2005) reinforce this picture and point to the rising importance of white collars and the 
remarkable reduction of the blue collar share in total income.
22 
                                                 
22 The white collar share went up to 34.4% of total income in 2002 (from 33.1% in 1992. The blue collar share went 
down by three percentage points, from 30% in 1992 to 27% in 2002.   36
Altogether, the data for the mostrecent sub-period show that the big picture presented in the 
previous sections does not signficantly change once variations in the quality of the labor input are 
accounted for. 
 
6.3 Is there a private services tax on manufacturing? 
Many private services, such as many of those classified among the business services, are direct 
inputs to manufacturing. Hence, to quantify the contribution of services to the overall productivity 
slowdown, it should be considered that this may be twofold, when services are produced for 
household final consumption and when they are intermediate inputs to other final goods industries, 
including, notably but not exclusively, manufacturing. 
This may shed additional light on the debate on Italy’s decline. If productivity in non-traded 
services grows slowly, this turns into a supply tax on domestic manufacturers. Notice that the same 
applies to a much lower extent to the slow productivity growth of manufacturers. Given the 
essentially tradable nature of manufacturing, domestic providers of private services, faced with 
inefficient manufacturing producers, may well resort to imported manufacturing goods. 
Preliminarily to evaluate the question of whether there is a private service tax on manufacturing, the 
methodological issue of productivity measurement in the services sector must be taken up once 
again.
23 
TFP – our measure of efficiency - is computed under a number of simplifying assumptions such as 
constant returns to scale and perfect competition in product and factor markets. These, while 
analytically convenient and widely used, are all probably far from truth. Changes in TFP might in 
fact reflect changes in market power in case returns to scale are not constant. Hence, what we call 
TFP might simply be market power and non-constant returns to scale. 
If this were the case, the evidence of the pronounced productivity slowdown in private services as 
seen in recent years might simply reflect the increased competitiveness in some of these industries 
rather than sheer productivity difficulties. By the same token, the improved productivity 
performance in utilities may simply reflect the enhanced scope for extra-profits enjoyed by the 
formerly public and now privatized companies providing utilities. 
Recent empirical work in this area sheds light on these two issues. In particular, Faini, Haskell, 
Barba Navaretti, Scarpa and Wey (2005) document that the progress in economic reform in services 
industries in Germany, Italy and the UK has been extremely slow. The recent OECD (2005) broad 
report on progress in policy reform concludes the same. According to the data in the OECD Report, 
Italy remains one of the most protective countries as to professional services, finance, and banking. 
                                                 
23 Standard references on this topic are Griliches (1992) and Dean and Kunze (1992).   37
This is nicely summarized in Figure 12 below, which originates from the data on Product Market 
Regulation in the OECD Database. These data provide useful tools to monitor the regulatory 
changes between 1998 and 2003. 
The main take-up of Figure 12 is that Italy did decrease product market regulation between 1998 
and 2003. Yet, in spite of all the fuss over the importance of deregulation to regain competitiveness, 
Italy’s position in the OECD ranking has remained the same. 
Concerning the effects of reform on productivity, both reports tend to be optimistic. Quoting Faini, 
Haskell, Barba Navaretti, Scarpa and Wey: “Liberalization has a definitely positive effect on 
productivity” (meaning labor productivity, for they do not look at TFP). At the same time, however, 
they also recognize that: “(…) energy, water, railways and postal services the most visible effect of 
reforms has been the reduction in the initial over-manning. Productivity has typically risen, mostly 
as reflection of the decrease in employment, rather than a post liberalization boom in output. (…) In 
some cases, productivity may increase even well before privatisation and liberalisation; as shown 
for instance by Italy’s electricity sector, incumbent firms may boost their efficiency enhancing 
efforts in anticipation of a more competitive environment (..)“ 
Moreover, in the same Report it also added that: “ (…) most often efficiency gains did not fully 
translate into lower prices (…)” and that “(…) prices did not decrease as much as expected partly 
because of the limited competition that countries were able and willing to introduce. Equally 
crucially, the reform process involved a number of sectors where price was initially below average 
cost, thereby requiring heavy public subsidies. In sectors such as railways or water, market oriented 
reforms that brought prices in line with costs were bound to result in substantial increases in prices. 
Finally, the alleged need to fund large infrastructural investments has also resulted in relatively high 
prices, particularly when regulation has maintained a price setting role. (…)”. 
 
Figure 12. Regulation in 1998 and 2003   38
1. Sorted by 2003 values. The scale of indicators is 0-6 from least to most restrictive of competition.











































































































































































Source: Conway, Janod, and Nicoletti  (2005) 
Altogether, these findings point to a still limited extent of product market deregulation and rather 
small efficiency effects of the deregulation seen so far, given the imperfect transmission of the 
potential productivity gains onto lower consumer prices. This is consistent with he other pieces of 
evidence provided by Torrini (2005) where it is carefully documented how the increased value   39
added share of capital in the 1990s has essentially originated in the non-manufacturing part of the 
economy. 
Adding all these elements up, one may try and roughly quantify the extent of the market services 
tax on manufacturing costs, by computing the share of the TFP growth reduction in manufacturing 
accounted for by the TFP reduction in market services and weighted by their share in manufacturing 
output.
24 When this is done and the Finance, Trade and Other business services shares in total 
manufacturing output is set to, respectively, 0.09, 0.07 and 0.07 (as reported in Faini, Haskell, 
Barba Navaretti, Scarpa and Wey (2005, Table 4.3)), the results are as follows: the private services 
tax on manufacturing is, contrary to the common wisdom, rather small. 
If one compares TFP growth in manufacturing in 1995-03 with its long-run average in 1980-95, a 
negative difference of about two percentage points obtains. How much of this is explained by the 
TFP growth changes in market services? Practically, zero. This is because the financial sector did 
actually increase its TFP growth in 1995-03, and this increase was just enough to offset the negative 
impact of the TFP growth slowdown in Trade and Other services. 
If the experiment is repeated considering the 2000-03 period, bigger figures obtain: TFP growth in 
the financial sector and trade falls by, respectively, 1.7 and 2.4 percentage points compared to 1980-
95 (while staying almost constant in Other business services). This gives a negative contribution of 
declining TFP growth in market services of about one third of a percentage point, a bare one tenth 
of the overall decline in TFP growth experienced in manufacturing (-3.3 percentage points) in 2000-
03. 
Based on such calculations, the cause of the declining TFP growth in manufacturing seems not 
determined by the disappointing performance of Italy’s service sector. 
 
7. Conclusions 
This article is an attempt to look in detail at the nitty-gritty of Italy’s economic decline. 
We uncover that Italy’s productivity problem is really twofold, on the manufacturing side and the 
private services side. 
To be sure, the manufacturing question was there already when Pasquale Saraceno - perhaps the 
most authoritative Mezzogiorno expert of the 1950s generation - was writing. Then the main point 
was that the industrial revolution had been weak and half-hearted in Italy, due to the perverse 
modes of interaction between banks, firms and the Government. 
                                                 
24 This experiment is similar to the one undertaken in Daveri and Silva (2004).   40
We don’t know whether Saraceno was right. Our data, however, indicate that, for a long period of 
time, Italy’s manufacturing did well. Now it is not doing well any more and may be on a declining 
path, having lost ground in its most fundamental engine, its ability to innovate and gain efficiency. 
Note that this is not a necessary side effect of de-industrialization: often, as employment is released 
from one sector to other sectors in the economy, this may set off forces that make productivity grow 
faster. This has not been the case in Italy’s manufacturing sector in the last ten years or so. 
Altogether, it seems as though the following sentences have not been written long ago: 
“In the first period, the time series of investment flows are stationary. This 
is possibly due to the general scarcity of capital. (…) This is because after 
the Unification, capital would rather go to the Savings Institutes rather than 
towards industrial enterprises. There was moreover a scarcity of machinery 
made in Italy necessary to carry out the investment plans. In addition to that, 
the price of energy was high, while skilled labor was rather scarce as well” 
 
This was Ornello Vitali (1969, p.100), when speaking of the dynamics of investment in Italy in 
1861-1876: one century ago, it seems today, once “Savings Institutes” is replaced by “newly 
privatized industries”. 
On the services side, the productivity issue is not so much in terms of a sudden decline in its growth 
rate, but in the continuation of a past where the lack of innovation was the rule. With an eye to 
international trends in this sector, Italy’s productivity decline in market services has thus more the 
flavor of a missed opportunity rather than of an outright decline. 
Given the available evidence, the route to take to fight Italy’s productivity slowdown looks simple 
on paper: raise the rate of return of investment and ease resource reallocation to high-productivity 
industries from low-productivity (but possibly high-rent!) industries. Yet these goals are not 
necessarily consistent with a continuation of the reform undertaken in the last few years, namely 
privatization and labor market liberalization, which – although necessary and largely beneficial in 
other respects – have so far had mixed effects on productivity trends. Deepening our understanding 
of the productivity counterpart of such reforms remains a relatively little explored area of exciting 
research for the next few years.   41
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Appendix – Data description 
 
Data sources 
The data used in this paper are gathered from the Groningen Growth and Development Center 
(GGDC), the OECD STAN and Productivity databases and from ISTAT – National Accounts.  
Value added at constant prices (1995), labor compensations per employees and total employment is 
from OECD – STAN, while the total factor productivity index for the whole economy (Table 3) is 
from OECD Productivity database. Productive capital stocks are from ISTAT – National Accounts. 
Our industry data refer to 27 sectors corresponding to the sub-sections of NACE Rev.1 
classification for mining and manufacturing industries and to the sections for the other sectors, with 
the exclusion of Public administration and defense (section L) of Private households with employed 
persons (section P) and Letting of own property (group 70.2). 
 
Hours worked vs. full-time equivalent employment 
 
As stated in the main text, we used full-time equivalent employment instead of hours worked in our 
TFP calculation because these latter are available only for a short time period (1993-2003). Here we 
report the definition of both measures of labor input in order to clarify why they may differ. 
According to ESA95, “total hours worked” represents the aggregate number of hours actually 
worked as an employee or self-employed during the accounting period “when their output is within 
the production boundary” (ESA95, 11.26). “Full-time equivalent employment (FTE)” equals the 
number of FTE jobs, a job being defined as “an explicit or implicit contract between a person and a 
resident institutional unit to perform work in return for compensation for a defined period or until 
further notice” (ESA95, 11.22). FTE employment is thus defined as the number of total hours 
worked divided by the average annual number of hours worked in full-time jobs within the 
economic territory (ESA95, 11.32). 
It is therefore apparent that both level and dynamics of FTE employment and hours worked differ 
because FTE are determined mainly by the distribution of jobs between full-time, part-time and 
secondary occupations, while hours worked include also other components like overtime (ISTAT, 
2005). 
 